Funding the USPTO Each February the USPTO, in consultation with the President's administration, presents its budget request for the upcoming fiscal year, which runs from October through September, to Congress. These requests are based on the USPTO's forecasts of revenues (from user fees) and operational costs (expenditures on wages, rents and equipment) for the upcoming fiscal year. Congress, with input from the Congressional Budget Office about USPTO's requests, appropriates funds that become available for spending at the start of the fiscal year. 
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Despite recent patent law reforms, the US Patent and Trademark Office's ability to deal with inefficiencies in patent examination will continue to rely on the annual Congressional appropriations process.
T he America Invents Act, signed into law on September 16, 2011, enacts sweeping changes to the US patent system 1 . Besides switching US patent priority from the present 'first-to-invent' system to a 'first-to-file' system, expanding post-grant review options and prioritizing examination for technologies important to US competitiveness, the Act provides for the creation of a US Patent and Trademark Office Public Enterprise Fund in which to deposit the fees paid by users (patent and trademark applicants) of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The fund would be set aside for the USPTO's exclusive use so that Congress could not appropriate the deposits for other purposes. Another important change gives the USPTO authority to set its user fees in order to recover the cost of its operations.
These last two changes seek to give the USPTO more control over its revenues so that the agency can deal with mounting concerns about the speed and quality of patent examination 2 . A timely and accurate patent examination is critical for resolving uncertainty about inventors' property rights and promoting innovation. However, as noted by a recent Nature editorial, USPTO's authority to set fees and draw from the fund remains circumscribed by Congressional oversight, and according to some critics, the changes are insufficient to deal with concerns about patent examination 3, 4 .
What challenges does the USPTO face in a rapidly changing economic, innovation and intellectual property (IP) environment? How does the Congressional appropriations process influence the agency's ability to deal with these challenges? And what are the implications of the recent enactment to the relationship between the Congress and the USPTO, and the agency's responsibilities as the steward of an increasingly global innovation and IP landscape? This article addresses the above questions by providing historical facts related to the USPTO's funding and performance. I focus on the speed and quality of patent examination as measures of the agency's performance 5 . I analyze data from 1991 onwards because the USPTO was obligated under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 to fully cover the costs of its operations-including prior art search, patent and trademark examination, and administration-through the fees it charges users with no funding from US taxpayers. p aT e n T s npg method inventions, and procedural changes to "continuation applications" in 1995 and 2000 that made it easier for applicants to request continued examination of their rejected applications 6, 7 .
Although the USPTO uses sophisticated forecasting models to calculate budget requests, increases in applications due to judicial, legislative and technological 'shocks' are impossible to accurately forecast. Also, because the USPTO submits its requests to Congress in February, and Congress enacts appropriations in October, appropriations are based on forecasts that are ten months old-a lag that amplifies the effect of unavoidable errors in forecasting. And as explained above, Congress has diverted a large portion of the agency's revenues from fees for other purposes. Therefore, in years when the application rate was higher than forecast, the USPTO could not use the revenues from additional fee collections to deal with the unanticipated flow of applications, resulting in a mounting backlog of unexamined applications.
The USPTO's response to the unanticipated growth in applications was further hampered by: (i) a growing demand in the 1990s for private-sector scientists and engineers that increased examiner attrition and made it more difficult for the agency to hire replacements, especially in emerging technological areas (such as business methods and biotech); (ii) new examiners requiring at least three years of training before they can process applications at full capacity and, thus, replace examiners that leave (Supplementary Table 4 shows that examiner attrition peaked during the years when pending patent applications were experiencing above-average growth rates and that the annual growth rate of examiners has been significantly lower than the growth rate of pending patent applications during 1991-2010); and (iii) the lack of borrowing authority to finance multi-year capital needs (such as IT infrastructure) required to deal with the near doubling of pending applications between 1997 and 2001.
Hence, unanticipated increases in patent applications and inadequate resources at the USPTO to deal with the increases, precipitated by Congressional diversions of the agency's revenues during the last 20 years have contributed, at least in part, to the explosion of pending applications and delays in patent examination.
Several scholars argue that the increasing burden on examiners has led to a decrease in the quality of patent examination at the USPTO 8 . An incomplete patent examination process can harm innovation by creating uncertainty about property rights, distorting investments in R&D and forcing inventors to to the USPTO have been lower than its revenues from user fees. The USPTO does not have the authority to spend fee collections that exceed its appropriations for the fiscal year, even when those fees are for additional work that the agency must perform. These additional revenues from its users have been unavailable to the USPTO-Congress diverted $1.04 billion, or 4% of the agency's revenues during 1991-2010, to the Treasury's general fund for other purposes.
Challenges at the USPTO
One measure of delay in patent examination is 'patent pendency'-the time between the filing of a patent application and its grant or abandonment. Alternatively, 'first-action pendency' measures the time between the filing of an application and the 'first action' , or the examiner's formal communication to the applicant of the preliminary decision regarding the patentability of an application. Unlike patent pendency, which includes the time applicants take to respond to examiners' questions, first-action pendency discounts delays caused by applicants and, thus, more accurately reflects delays caused by the USPTO's patentexamination process.
Average patent pendency at the USPTO nearly doubled from 18.2 months in 1991 to 35.3 months in 2010. During the same period, average first-action pendency nearly quadrupled, rising from 7.6 months to 25.7 months Table 3 displays the number of patent applications at the different technology centers at the USPTO for each year between 2001-2010).
Scholars have offered many explanations for the recent growth in patenting, including: the 1990s' boom in information and communication technologies, a change in the term of US patents in 1995 (from 17 years after issue date to 20 years after filing date), a 1998 court decision that upheld the patentability of business PAT e n T S npg incur substantial litigation expenses to either defend or challenge patents 9 .
Although no single metric captures the quality of patent examination, 'quality' can be thought of as the probability that an examiner's decision-either to grant a patent or to reject an application-survives closer scrutiny. To gauge the outcomes of scrutiny, I assembled data on the probability that the US courts and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) ruled against examiners' decisions regarding patentability.
Only a minority of lawsuits are eventually settled by the courts (a majority of the cases reach out-of-court settlements), and among those that were, the courts ruled against the USPTO's decision to allow patents in 17.4% of the cases, on average, between 1993 and 2009 (Supplementary Table 5 presents data on the number of patent-related lawsuits, court decisions and outcomes). However, litigation data do not reveal a systematic trend suggesting either an increase or a decrease in the quality of patent examination during the period of this study. The BPAI, in response to ex parte appeals, reversed, on average, 38.6% of examiners' decisions to reject applications, but these data also do not provide evidence for either an increase or a decrease in the quality of examination during the last two decades (Supplementary Table 6 reports trends in disposals of ex parte appeals by the BPAI).
I also found no evidence to suggest that owing to increasing workloads, patent examiners are taking less time to examine patents or that they have become overly generous in allowing patents. On the contrary, the average time spent by an examiner on an application increased from 18 h in 1991 to 22.4 h in 2010, and patent-allowance rates dropped from 65.5% in 1991 to 45.6% in 2010 (Supplementary Table 7 displays statistics for the number of allowances and examiner's time spent in prosecution for each of the years during 1991-2010). Hence, data on various aspects related to quality do not support the view that the quality of examination has declined during the last two decades 10 . This finding, however, does not undercut the importance of an accurate examination system for promoting innovation.
Policy implications
How can the USPTO deal with concerns about inefficiencies in its patent examination system and be responsive to an ever-changing innovation and IP landscape?
Motivated by the recent legislative change, I have focused on how the annual appropriations process may have constrained the USPTO's timely response to judicial, legislative and technological shocks that affected its workload in the last two decades. The America Invents Act appears to give the USPTO greater control over its revenues from user fees, and hence some leeway to deal with future shocks, but the Act retains Congressional oversight of the agency's purse.
The user fees collected by the USPTO reflect a complex balance between the costs to the public of granting monopoly rights and the benefits of encouraging innovation, and cannot be solely tied to the quality of service offered by the agency to its users. Yet, a slow and questionable patent examination process, at arguably the world's most influential patent office, not only harms users, but imposes a significant drag on innovation in the United States and beyond. Hence, Congress has a responsibility to ensure that the USPTO is not stifled in its ability to deal with concerns about inefficiencies in its patent examination process due to vagaries in its workload 11, 12 . This is particularly important now, as the USPTO has made a commitment to overhaul its procedures, and these changes, when implemented, are likely to affect the agency's workload in unexpected ways.
More control of its finances alone, however, is unlikely to ameliorate the quality and timeliness of the USPTO's patent examination process in the long run. A rough calculation suggests that even if workloads were constant at current levels, the agency would need an additional sum (over and above the funding required to process the new applications) of $450 million (or nearly 23% of its annual appropriations) over the next three years to bring down first-action pendency to 1991 levels (7.6 months). The USPTO needs to re-examine its internal procedures and practices, such as the application-continuation process and the wages and performance incentives of examiners, which may be contributing to inefficiencies in patent examination. And with foreign inventors' share of utility patent applications at the USPTO rising from 46% in 1991 to 51% in 2009, the sharing of patent examination work (such as prior-art search) with other international patent offices might also shield the USPTO from vagaries in its workload.
Note: Supplementary information is available on the Nature Biotechnology website.
